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___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
   
 
 
 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 In this putative class action, consumers of prescription 
eye medication allege that manufacturers and distributors of 
the medication packaged it in such a way that forced them to 
waste it, violating the consumer protection statutes of their 
home states.  The District Court dismissed the entire action for 
lack of jurisdiction, finding the consumers’ allegations of 
injury in fact insufficient to confer standing.  For the reasons 
that follow, we will reverse the dismissal, and remand the case 
for further consideration.  
 
I1 
  
                                              
 1 “When reviewing an order of dismissal for lack of 
standing, we accept as true all material allegations of the 
complaint and construe them in favor of the plaintiff.”  
Danvers Motor Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 432 F.3d 286, 288 
(3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Conte Bros. Auto., Inc. v. Quaker 
State–Slick 50, Inc., 165 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1998)).  We 
therefore will review the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs in their 
operative complaint.  See id. 
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Defendants are manufacturers and distributors of 
generic and brand-name prescription eye drop medications that 
are approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) 
to treat serious medical conditions such as glaucoma, a leading 
cause of blindness.2  Defendants sell these prescription 
medications in fluid form and package the fluid in plastic 
bottles.  Bottles are pre-packaged with a fixed volume of 
medication (e.g., 5.0 mL) sold at set prices.  Labeling on the 
bottles does not indicate how many doses or days of treatment 
a patient will be able to extract from the bottle.   
  
Medication is dispensed from the plastic bottles into 
patients’ eyes in drop form.  The dimensions of the bottle’s 
dropper tip dictate the size of the drop dispensed from that 
bottle.  In effect, the larger the bottle dropper tip, the larger the 
drop dispensed.  There is no reasonable way for a patient to 
instill less than one full drop into his or her eye.   
  
A plethora of scientific research conducted over the last 
four decades has examined the drop size of Defendants’ 
medications; some of the studies conducted were, in fact, 
sponsored and published by Defendants.  According to these 
                                              
 2 As detailed in the District Court’s opinion, the 
defendants in this case include both brand-name and generic 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and their distributors.  The 
brand name companies include: Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 
Alcon Research, Ltd., Allergan, Inc., Allergan USA, Inc., 
Allergan Sales, LLC, Pfizer Inc., Valeant Pharmaceuticals 
International, Inc., Bausch & Lomb, Inc., Aton Pharma, Inc., 
Merck & Co., Inc., and Merck, Sharpe & Dohme Corp.  The 
generic companies are Falcon Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., Sandoz 
Inc., Prasco LLC, and Akorn, Inc.  
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studies, a normal adult’s inferior fornix – the area between the 
eye and the lower eyelid – has a capacity of approximately 7 to 
10 microliters (“µLs”) of fluid.3  If a drop of medication 
exceeding that capacity is placed into an adult patient’s eye, 
excess medication is expelled.  Expelled medication may run 
down a patient’s cheek, providing no pharmaceutical benefit to 
the patient whatsoever.  This medication is “entirely wasted” 
by the patient.  App. 182.  Expelled medication also may flow 
into a patient’s tear ducts and move into his or her bloodstream.  
Medication entering a patient’s bloodstream may increase a 
patient’s risk of experiencing certain harmful systemic side 
effects.   
  
These studies conclude that eye drops should be 5 to 15 
µLs in order to maximize the amount of the medication 
entering the inner eye – the site of action for the medication.  
Drop sizes within this range minimize overflow “waste” and 
also minimize the risk of side effects.   
  
Despite the scientific consensus on drop size, all of 
Defendants’ products at issue emit drops that are considerably 
larger than 15 µLs.  In fact, a 2008 study showed that each 
Defendant’s drop size was more than two to three times the 15 
µL maximum recommended size.  Several Defendants sold 
products with drop sizes of 50 µL.  To put these data in 
perspective, at least half of every drop of medication dispensed 
from any one of Defendants’ product bottles goes to waste on 
a patient, and may put the patient at risk of side effects. 
  
                                              
 3 It can hold 20 to 30 µLs of fluid only for a moment, 
until the individual blinks.   
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Plaintiffs in this litigation are individuals who paid for 
Defendants’ eye drop medication.  They allege that Defendants 
have control over the design and dimensions of the bottle 
dropper tip, and thus could reduce the size of drops emitted 
from their product bottles, but have chosen not to do so.  
Plaintiffs do not purport to have personal knowledge as to why 
no defendant has reduced their products’ drop sizes.  However, 
Plaintiffs include in the Amended Complaint allegations that 
senior executives at Defendant Alcon explained to a consultant 
working with them that they were unwilling to reduce drop 
sizes because if they did, the company “would sell less product 
and make less money.”  App. 244. 
  
Plaintiffs aver that Defendants’ practices of selling 
medication in bottles that emit such large drops caused them 
“substantial” economic injury.  App. 214.  Specifically, 
Plaintiffs allege, “If the sizes of Defendants’ prescription eye 
drops were limited to the maximum effective size of 15 µL . . 
. the medication in the bottles would last longer and [Plaintiffs] 
would spend substantially less on their therapy than they do 
with larger, substantially wasted, eye drops.”  App. 214.  
Plaintiffs illustrated this point in their Amended Complaint 
with an example provided in a 2008 scientific study: 
 
[T]he average drop size for 
Allergan’s glaucoma drug 
Alphagan P . . . in a 5 mL bottle 
was 43 μL . . . . At the 
recommended dose of one drop in 
each affected eye three times daily, 
a 5 mL bottle would last a patient 
with bilateral glaucoma 20 days. 
That patient would go through 
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18.25 bottles in a year. In July 
2013, a 5 mL bottle of Alphagan P 
. . . cost $104.99.   A year’s course 
of treatment would therefore cost 
approximately $1,915. However, 
approximately 65% of the 
medication, the amount over 15 
μL, would be wasted.  If the drops 
had been only 15 μL, the patient 
would have needed only 6.46 
bottles a year, or 7.0 bottles if the 
drops had been 16 μL . . . .  The 
unneeded medication would cost 
the patient more than $1,100 a 
year. 
 
App. 215-216 (emphasis added).   Plaintiffs also quantified 
their individual economic injuries in charts attached to the 
Amended Complaint.   
 
Plaintiffs claim they could not have avoided these 
economic injuries; they were “compel[led] [by Defendants’ 
practices] to spend more money on their therapy than if the 
drops were 15 µL.”  App. 214.  They had no non-
pharmaceutical alternative treatments for their conditions.  
And there were no alternative products to Defendants’; “all 
prescription eye drops are substantially larger than 15 µL and 
therefore lead to wastage.”  App. 217.  Their only alternative 
was to forgo treatment and risk blindness or worsening 
eyesight.   
 
II 
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In September 2014, Plaintiffs filed a putative class 
action complaint, on behalf of themselves and other similarly 
situated parties, in the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey.  Plaintiffs asserted violations of the 
consumer protection laws of their respective home states: the 
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“NJCFA”), N.J.S.A. § 56:8-
1, et seq.; the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), 
Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; the Florida Deceptive 
and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), Fla. Stat. § 
501.201, et seq.; the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act (“ICFA”), 
815 ILCS 505/1, et seq.; the North Carolina Unfair and 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“NCUTDPA”), N.C.G.S. § 75-
1.1, et seq.; and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(“DTPA”), Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 17.41, et seq.  Plaintiffs 
claimed Defendants’ practices in manufacturing and selling 
prescription eye drop medication violated the statutes’ 
prohibitions on unfair or unconscionable trade practices.  The 
District Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ original complaint for lack 
of standing, without prejudice to Plaintiffs’ ability to amend 
the complaint and cure the standing deficiencies.   
  
In June 2015, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, 
asserting claims of unfair or unconscionable practices under 
the same six state consumer protection statutes.4  Plaintiffs 
                                              
 4 Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ 
practices were: (1) “unconscionable commercial practice[s]” 
under the NJCFA; (2) “unlawful” and “unfair” practices under 
the UCL; (3) “unfair acts or practices” under the FDUTPA; (4) 
“unfair acts or practices” under the ICFA; (5) “unfair . . . acts 
or practices” under the NCUDTPA; (6) and “unconscionable 
act[s]” under the DTPA.  App. 266-73 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   
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supported their allegations of unfair or unconscionable 
practices with: (a) scientific literature opining on costs savings 
occasioned by utilizing smaller drop sizes; and (b) charts 
showing each Plaintiff’s expenses.  The charts detailed 
Plaintiffs’ medication purchases and the out-of-pocket 
expenses they incurred for their purchases.  Using these charts 
and information about each product’s drop size, Plaintiffs 
calculated their total out-of-pocket payments on “wasted” 
medication.  These totals ranged from a few dollars to a few 
hundred dollars.   
  
In August 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint for lack of standing, federal 
preemption, and failure to state a claim.  The District Court 
granted Defendants’ motions, finding that Plaintiffs had not 
pleaded an injury in fact necessary to confer standing.  As a 
result, the court did not reach Defendants’ arguments on 
preemption and the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Plaintiffs then filed 
this timely appeal.  
 
III 
  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to the Class 
Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), because 
at least one member of the Plaintiff class is diverse from at least 
one of the Defendants, the putative class is composed of at least 
100 people, and the amount in controversy exceeds five million 
dollars.  We have jurisdiction over the District Court’s 
dismissal of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
  
We exercise plenary review over a dismissal for lack of 
standing.  In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar 
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Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 
IV 
 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 
power of the federal judiciary to “cases” and “controversies.”  
U.S. Const. art. III.   For a federal court to exercise jurisdiction 
under Article III, plaintiffs must allege – and eventually prove 
–  that they having “standing” to pursue their claims.  See Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).  The 
doctrine of standing emerged from “the traditional 
understanding of a case or controversy” in order “to ensure that 
federal courts do not exceed their [constitutional] authority” by 
“unsurp[ing] the powers of the political branches.”  Spokeo, 
Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (quoting Clapper 
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013)).  “The 
doctrine limits the category of litigants empowered to maintain 
a lawsuit in federal court to seek redress for a legal wrong.”  Id.   
 
The plaintiff, “as the party invoking federal 
jurisdiction,” bears the burden of establishing the minimal 
requirements of Article III standing: “(1) . . . an injury in fact, 
(2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the 
defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.”5  Id.  In assessing whether a plaintiff has 
carried this burden, we separate our standing inquiry from any 
assessment of the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.  To maintain 
                                              
 5 “In the context of class actions, Article III standing ‘is 
determined vis-a-vis the named parties.’”  McCray v. Fidelity 
Nat. Title Ins. Co., 682 F.3d 229, 243 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 F.3d 283, 306 (3d Cir. 
1998)). 
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this fundamental separation between standing and merits at the 
dismissal stage, we assume for the purposes of our standing 
inquiry that a plaintiff has stated valid legal claims.  Info. 
Handling Servs., Inc. v. Defense Automated Printing Servs., 
338 F.3d 1024, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).  While our standing inquiry may 
necessarily reference the “nature and source of the claim[s] 
asserted,” Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, our focus remains on 
whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring those claims, 
The Pitt News v. Fisher, 215 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 2000); 
White Tail Park, Inc. v. Stroube, 413 F.3d 451, 460-61 (4th Cir. 
2005).  
  
A 
 
This case centers on the “[f]irst and foremost” of the 
three standing elements, injury in fact.  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1547 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 
83, 103 (1998)).  The purpose of the injury-in-fact requirement, 
the Supreme Court has explained, is “to distinguish a person 
with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation – even though 
small – from a person with a mere interest in the problem.”  
United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency 
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (1973).  Put 
differently, the requirement serves to filter out those “with 
merely generalized grievances” who are “bringing suit to 
vindicate an interest common to the entire public.”  Friends of 
the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling Corp., 204 F.3d 
149, 156 (4th Cir. 2000).  The injury-in-fact requirement is 
“very generous” to claimants, demanding only that the 
claimant “allege[ ] some specific, ‘identifiable trifle’ of 
injury.”  Bowman v. Wilson, 672 F.2d 1145, 1151 (3d Cir. 
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1982) (quoting SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 686-90 & 689 n.14).  It “is 
not Mount Everest.”  Danvers, 432 F.3d at 294.   
 
To allege injury in fact sufficiently, a plaintiff must 
claim “that he or she suffered ‘an invasion of a legally 
protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and 
‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’”  Spokeo, 
136 S. Ct. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).  Typically, 
a plaintiff’s allegations of financial harm will easily satisfy 
each of these components, as financial harm is a “classic” and 
“paradigmatic form[]” of injury in fact.  Danvers, 432 F.3d at 
291, 293.  Indeed, we have explained that where a plaintiff 
alleges financial harm, standing “is often assumed without 
discussion.”  Id. at 293; see also Carter v. HealthPort Techs., 
LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Any monetary loss 
suffered by the plaintiff satisfies [the injury-in-fact] element; 
‘[e]ven a small financial loss’ suffices.” (quoting Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc. v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 710 F.3d 71, 85 (2d 
Cir. 2013))); Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. 
E.P.A., 990 F.2d 1531, 1537 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Pecuniary injury 
is clearly a sufficient basis for standing.” (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted)).   
 
Although the District Court provided a detailed 
recitation of standing law in its opinion, including the 
components of injury in fact, it did not apply those individual 
components to Plaintiffs’ allegations.  Rather, it framed its 
injury-in-fact analysis around broader principles and theories 
of standing, as did the parties in their briefing to this Court.  
This approach has some persuasive appeal.  But where the 
court or litigants cast aside the essential components of injury 
in fact in favor of more generalized, abstract discussion, they 
risk improperly, if inadvertently, crossing over in their analysis 
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from standing to merits.  So we take a different tack; we will 
address in turn each component of injury in fact. 
 
1 
  
The first component of the injury-in-fact test offered by 
Spokeo – “legally protected interests” – warrants the most 
discussion in this case.  The Supreme Court has not defined the 
term “legally protected interest” as it pertains to Article III 
standing, nor has it clarified whether the term does any 
independent work in the standing analysis.  The Court first 
introduced the term in Lujan.  504 U.S. at 560; see Judicial 
Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 432 F.3d 359, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(Williams, J., concurring).  And it appeared – without 
elaboration – as recently as last year in Spokeo in the Court’s 
recitation of Lujan’s injury-in-fact test.  136 S. Ct. at 1548.  
Between Lujan and Spokeo though, it has not appeared with 
regularity in Supreme Court opinions addressing standing.  A 
host of the Court’s standing opinions have omitted the term 
altogether,6 and it has rarely been applied.  See Judicial Watch, 
                                              
 
6 See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (stating “an injury 
must be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (“Standing under 
Article III of the Constitution requires that an injury be 
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent . . . .”); 
Massachusetts v. U.S. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) 
(formulating the Lujan injury-in-fact test as requiring “a 
litigant [to] demonstrate that it has suffered a concrete and 
particularized injury that is either actual or imminent”); 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 
528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000) (“In Lujan[, 504 U.S. at 560-61], we 
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432 F.3d at 363 (Williams, J., concurring).  This may suggest 
that “legally protected interest” is simply a reformulation of the 
other components of injury in fact.  Id.   
  
However, if we assume arguendo that the term “do[es] 
some work in the standing analysis,” Initiative & Referendum 
Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc), 
we can discern a number of guideposts from the Supreme 
Court’s standing jurisprudence about what it may – and may 
not – require that bear on this case.  The most important is this: 
in this context, whether a plaintiff has alleged an invasion of a 
“legally protected interest” does not hinge on whether the 
conduct alleged to violate a statute does, as a matter of law, 
violate the statute.  Were we to conclude otherwise, we would 
effectively collapse our evaluation under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim into an Article 
III standing evaluation.  Every losing claim would be 
dismissed – without prejudice7 – for lacking standing in the 
first place.  Id. at 1092; White Tail Park, 413 F.3d at 460-61; 
                                              
held that, to satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a 
plaintiff must show (1) it has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is 
(a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical . . . .”); Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103 
(describing an injury in fact as “a harm suffered by the plaintiff 
that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).   
 
 7 Because the absence of standing leaves the court 
without subject matter jurisdiction to reach a decision on the 
merits, dismissals “with prejudice” for lack of standing are 
generally improper.  See Korvettes, Inc. v. Brous, 617 F.2d 
1021, 1024 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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Claybrook v. Slater, 111 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1997); see 
also In re Special Grand Jury 89-2, 450 F.3d 1159, 1172 (10th 
Cir. 2006) (observing that the Supreme Court “has made clear 
that a plaintiff can have standing . . . even though the interest 
would not be protected by the law in that case”).  And we 
would “thwart a major function of the standing doctrine – to 
avoid premature judicial involvement in resolution of issues on 
the merits.”  Judicial Watch, 432 F.3d at 364 (Williams, J., 
concurring). 
  
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that financial or economic interests are “legally protected 
interests” for purposes of the standing doctrine.  See Vermont 
Agency of Nat. Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 772-
77 (2000); Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432 (1998); 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733-34 (1972); see also 
Cent. Ariz. Water, 990 F.2d at 1537 (stating that “pecuniary or 
economic injury is generally a legally protected interest,” so 
long as that economic injury meets the remaining requirements 
of the injury-in-fact test); Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal 
Jurisdiction § 2.3, at 76 (7th ed. 2016) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has deemed economic harms sufficient injuries for 
standing). 
  
Third, “legally protected interests” may arise from the 
Constitution, from common law, or “solely by virtue of 
‘statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates 
standing.’”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576-78 (quoting Warth, 422 
U.S. at 500).  Both federal law and state law – including state 
statutes – “can create interests that support standing in federal 
courts.”  Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 684 
(9th Cir. 2001) (citing FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 
992 (7th Cir. 1988)).  
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Fourth, the interest asserted must be “related to the 
injury in fact”; it cannot be “merely a ‘byproduct’ of the suit 
itself.”  Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 772-73.  To illustrate, a 
qui tam relator who is entitled to a portion of a recovery if his 
suit under the False Claims Act is successful has a legally 
protected interest in the outcome of the suit.  Id. at 772.  An 
individual who has simply placed a wager on the outcome does 
not.  Id.; see also Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 107 (“[A] plaintiff 
cannot achieve standing to litigate a substantive issue by 
bringing suit for the cost of bringing suit.”). 
  
With these guideposts in mind, we look to Plaintiffs’ 
Amended Complaint.  Plaintiffs claim economic interests: 
interests in the money they had to spend on medication that 
was impossible for them to use.  They seek monetary 
compensation for Defendants’ conduct that they allege caused 
harm to these interests.  Plaintiffs’ claimed interests arise from 
state consumer protection statutes that provide monetary relief 
to private individuals who are damaged by business practices 
that violate those statutes.  These claims fit comfortably in 
categories of “legally protected interests” readily recognized 
by federal courts.  See Cantrell, 241 F.3d at 684. 
  
We acknowledge that the Seventh Circuit held 
otherwise in a recent case concerning materially identical 
allegations against many of the same defendants.  Eike v. 
Allergan, Inc., 850 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2017).  In reviewing the 
defendants’ appeal from the district court’s grant of class 
certification, the Seventh Circuit concluded that plaintiffs had 
failed to allege a “legally protected interest,” and therefore, 
lacked standing.  Id. at 318.  The Court noted that the Plaintiffs’ 
pleading “lack[ed] . . . any suggestion of collusion . . . or any 
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claim” of misrepresentation or deception by defendants.  Id. at 
317.  From the absence of fraud-based allegations, the court 
went on to reason that the plaintiffs’ claims were necessarily 
“based simply on [their] dissatisfaction” with the defendants’ 
products or their prices.  Id. at 317.  We decline to adopt the 
Court’s rationale.     
  
This reasoning fails to recognize a category of business 
practices entirely separate from practices that are fraudulent, 
deceptive, or misleading – “unfair” business practices – 
prohibited under the state consumer protection statutes 
invoked.  The plaintiffs in Eike explicitly alleged that the 
defendants’ practices in manufacturing and selling eye 
medication were “unfair” under the Illinois Consumer Fraud & 
Deceptive Practices Act (“ICFA”) and the Missouri 
Merchandising Practices Act (“MMPA”).  See Eike v. 
Allergan, Inc., 2014 WL 1040728, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 
2014), vacated, 850 F.3d 315 (7th Cir. 2017).8  The Court was 
                                              
 8 Under the ICFA, “[a] plaintiff is entitled to recovery . 
. . when there is unfair or deceptive conduct” and “may allege 
that conduct is unfair . . . without alleging that the conduct is 
deceptive.”  Siegel v. Shell Oil Co., 612 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 
2010) (emphasis added).  Under the MMPA, “[t]he act . . . by 
any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false 
promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice or the 
concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact in 
connection with the sale . . . of any merchandise . . . is declared 
to be an unlawful practice.”  Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.020 
(emphasis added).  The definition of “unfair” under the MMPA 
is “unrestricted, all-encompassing, and exceedingly broad.”  
Conway v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 438 S.W.3d 410, 416 (Mo. 
2014) (citation omitted). 
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obliged to take these allegations as true for purposes of the 
standing inquiry.  Yet nowhere in its opinion does the term 
“unfair” even appear.  See generally Eike, 850 F.3d 315.   
  
Even setting aside the difference between “deceptive” 
and “unfair” practices under the state consumer protection 
statutes, the Court in Eike blended standing and merits together 
in a manner that the Supreme Court has exhaustively cautioned 
courts against.   The Seventh Circuit seemed to begin its 
standing analysis with a determination that the plaintiffs had 
“no cause of action.”  Id. at 317-18.  Because they had no cause 
of action, the Court reasoned, they had no injury.  Id. at 318.  
Because they had no injury, they had no standing to sue.  Id.   
  
This logic flips the standing inquiry inside out, 
morphing it into a test of the legal validity of the plaintiffs’ 
claims of unlawful conduct.  But as we have already 
emphasized, a valid claim for relief is not a prerequisite for 
standing.  Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96 (explaining that “the 
nonexistence of a cause of action was no proper basis for a 
jurisdictional dismissal” and highlighting the “fundamental 
distinction between arguing” that plaintiffs have no cause of 
action and arguing that they do not have Article III standing); 
see also Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 218-19 (2011) 
(noting the distinction between whether a plaintiff has a “cause 
of action” and whether he or she has “standing”).  Indeed, the 
Seventh Circuit has acknowledged as much in other cases.  For 
instance, in Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 
F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003), it faulted the district court for finding 
that the plaintiffs had no standing to pursue their claims against 
state officials for violations of a federal statute.  Id. at 908-09.  
There, it explained:     
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The district judge ruled that none 
of [the relevant statutory 
provisions] entitled the plaintiffs 
to what they were seeking and that 
therefore the plaintiffs had not 
been injured by a violation of the 
statute and so lacked standing to 
sue.  This is a misunderstanding of 
standing.  A plaintiff has standing 
to sue – that is, he can invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court – if he is 
tangibly, materially, injured by the 
conduct of the defendant that he 
claims is unlawful . . . . [I]f the 
consequence [of his claim lacking 
merit] were that he lacked 
standing, then every decision in 
favor of a defendant would be a 
decision that the court lacked 
jurisdiction, entitling the plaintiff 
to start over in another court.  
 
Id. at 909.  
  
The District Court here, like the Seventh Circuit, cast 
the Plaintiffs’ allegations as mere grumblings that Defendants’ 
products were priced too high or packaged inefficiently, 
because the allegations lacked notes of fraud, deception, or 
misrepresentation.  But as in Eike, the absence of fraud 
allegations in the Amended Complaint was purposeful; 
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants’ practices were unfair and 
unconscionable, not deceptive or fraudulent.  And like the 
statutes at issue in Eike, the statutes enumerated in Plaintiffs’ 
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Amended Complaint prohibit business practices that are 
“unfair” or “unconscionable” in addition to practices that are 
fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading; these terms are defined 
separately and differently in the text of the statutes and in 
relevant case law interpreting them.9  Therefore, the District 
                                              
 9 See Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1203 
(9th Cir. 2010) (“A business act or practice may violate the 
[UCL] if it is either unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent.  Each of 
these three adjectives captures a separate and distinct theory of 
liability.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
Siegel, 612 F.3d at 935 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that “[a] 
plaintiff is entitled to recovery under [the] ICFA when there is 
unfair or deceptive conduct” and “may allege that conduct is 
unfair . . . without alleging that the conduct is deceptive”); 
PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Property Mgmt., Inc., 842 So.2d 773, 777 
(Fla. 2003) (defining an “unfair practice” under the FDUTPA 
as “one that offends established public policy and one that is 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially 
injurious to consumers” and noting a separate definition for 
“deception” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); 
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454, 462 (N.J. 1994) 
(explaining that an unconscionable practice can qualify as 
unlawful under the NJCFA, “even if no person was in fact 
misled or deceived thereby”); Lon Smith & Assocs., Inc. v. Key, 
2017 WL 3298391, at *11 (Tex. Ct. App. Aug 3, 2017) (“The 
DTPA defines ‘[u]nconscionable action or course of action’ as 
‘an act or practice which, to a consumer’s detriment, takes 
advantage of the lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or 
capacity of the consumer to a grossly unfair degree.’” (quoting 
Tex. Bus. & Comm. Code Ann. § 17.45(5))); Melton v. Family 
First Mortg. Corp., 576 S.E.2d 365, 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“A practice is unfair [under the NCUDTPA] when it offends 
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Court’s characterization of Plaintiffs’ claims as “sound[ing] in 
fraud” was inaccurate, and the conclusion that Plaintiffs were 
without standing due, in part, to the absence of theories of 
injury “normally attendant to consumer fraud claims,” App. 23, 
misses the mark.  Moreover, the District Court’s chain of 
reasoning – that because Plaintiffs made no allegations of 
fraud, they suffered no injury, and therefore had no standing to 
sue – blends standing with merits in the same manner as Eike.   
  
For these reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs have 
sufficiently alleged “legally protected interests.” 
 
2 
 
We turn to the next component of injury in fact: 
concreteness.  For an injury to be “concrete,” it must be “real” 
and “actually exist”; it cannot be “abstract.”  Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1548 (internal citations omitted).  Bare procedural or 
technical violations of a statute alone will not satisfy the 
concreteness requirement.  Id. at 1549; see also Allen v. Wright, 
468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984) (“[A]n asserted right to have the 
Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, 
standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.”), 
abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377 (2014).  Here, 
Plaintiffs do not simply allege that Defendants’ practices 
violated state consumer protection statutes.  They allege that 
                                              
established public policy as well as when the practice is 
immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially 
injurious to consumers” and offering a separate definition for 
“deceptive” practices (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
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those violations caused each of them tangible, economic harm.  
This satisfies the concreteness requirement.   
 
3 
 
An injury must be both concrete and particularized; 
these are distinct components of injury in fact.  Spokeo, 136 S. 
Ct. at 1548.  “For an injury to be ‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect 
the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’”  Id. at 1548; 
see also In re Schering Plough, 678 F.3d at 245 (noting that the 
party seeking review must be “himself among the injured” 
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)); The Pitt News, 215 F.3d at 
360.  Although “[g]eneralized grievances” common to the 
public will not suffice, Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 862 F.3d 310, 
318 (3d Cir. 2017), “[t]he fact that an injury may be suffered 
by a large number of people does not of itself make that injury 
a nonjusticiable generalized grievance,” Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 
1548 n.7.  Requiring a plaintiff to allege facts establishing he 
is personally injured by a defendant’s conduct places “the 
decision as to whether review will be sought in the hands of 
those who have a direct stake in the outcome.”  Sierra Club v. 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 (1972).  Here, each Plaintiff alleges 
financial harm that he or she has personally incurred in 
purchasing medication that was impossible for him or her to 
use.  There can be no dispute that this harm is particularized.   
 
4 
 
Finally, we must determine whether Plaintiffs’ alleged 
injuries are “actual or imminent” rather than merely 
“conjectural or hypothetical.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.  This 
component of injury-in-fact is designed to separate those 
plaintiffs who have alleged “that [they] ha[ve] been or will in 
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fact be perceptibly harmed by the challenged [defendants’] 
action” from those who claim only that they “can imagine 
circumstances in which [they] could be affected by the 
[defendant’s] action.” SCRAP, 412 U.S. at 688-89.  Plaintiffs’ 
“pleadings must be something more than an ingenious 
academic exercise in the conceivable.”  Id. 
 
Plaintiffs attempt to measure their financial harm by 
way of two “theories” outlined in their Amended Complaint: 
(1) the cost differential between what they would have paid for 
their course of medication from smaller tipped bottles and what 
they actually paid for the larger tipped bottles (the “pricing 
theory”); or (2) the total overflow from each drop administered 
that was impossible for them to use (the “reimbursement 
theory”).  These are two ways of calculating the same thing: 
the cost of “wasted” medication that Plaintiffs allege they were 
compelled to purchase but could not use.  Under both theories, 
the total financial harm works out to be the same.  And under 
both theories, Plaintiffs’ claimed financial harm has already 
occurred, it is not merely possible, or even probable.  So there 
is no question of adequate imminence in this case.  See 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210 (1995) 
(noting that the plaintiff “of course” had standing to seek 
damages for alleged past economic injury, as opposed to 
alleged risks of future injuries); Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China 
Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 966-97 (7th Cir. 2016); Maya v. 
Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1069 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(“Allegedly, plaintiffs spent money that, absent defendants’ 
actions, they would not have spent . . . . This is a quintessential 
injury-in-fact.”).    
 
Despite this, the District Court rejected Plaintiffs’ 
“pricing theory” of “actual” harm as too speculative to support 
  
29 
 
 
standing in this case.  The District Court interpreted Plaintiffs’ 
pricing theory to rely on two critical presumptions: (a) 
Defendants would have reduced the volume of medication in 
each bottle to correspond with the lower volume of medication 
needed for a patient’s course of therapy; and (b) Defendants 
would have reduced the price of a bottle of medication in 
accordance with the reduction in volume.  It rejected the 
second premise, because it had “no way of knowing whether 
Defendants would price their products [based on volume], 
particularly since the pricing of pharmaceuticals is complex.”  
App. 20-21.   
 
We might be inclined to agree with the District Court 
that the pricing theory was too speculative if it, in fact, had 
depended on these presumptions.  But it did not.  Plaintiffs 
alleged under the pricing theory that smaller tipped bottles 
would lower the cost of their medication treatment regimen.  
Treatment costs could have been lowered in several ways, only 
one of which involved lowering the actual price of the bottle of 
medication.  Alternatively, Plaintiffs would have paid less for 
their course of medication if they were able to extract more 
doses of medication – at least twice as many doses, according 
to the allegations – out of the same bottle, without any changes 
from the status quo in bottle pricing, physicians’ prescribing 
practices, or the volume of medication in each bottle.   
 
Plaintiffs illustrated in the Amended Complaint how 
smaller tipped bottles would reduce the number of bottles 
needed for a one-year therapy regimen, and the resulting cost 
savings, by referencing an example in a 2008 scientific study, 
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as detailed supra.10  Plaintiffs also supported this iteration of 
the pricing theory by citing to numerous other scientific studies 
in the Amended Complaint.  See, e.g., App. 240 (noting that 
“[o]bviously a smaller drop size would mean that more doses 
could be dispensed from each bottle of medication, providing 
cost savings to patients and managed care providers” (quoting 
Richard Fiscella et al., Efficiency of Instillation Methods for 
Prostaglandin Medications, 22 J. Ocular Pharmacology and 
Therapeutics 477, 478 (2006))).  This alternative iteration of 
the pricing theory is far less speculative than the iteration of 
the pricing theory that the District Court understood Plaintiffs 
to be advancing.  It is also far less speculative than the theory 
of financial harm we rejected in Finkelman v. Nat’l Football 
League, 810 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2016), the primary case on 
which the District Court relied here.   
 
In Finkelman, one plaintiff alleged that the National 
Football League’s (“NFL”) policy on distributing Superbowl 
tickets forced him to pay more for his ticket in the resale market 
than he otherwise would have.  Id. at 190-91, 199-200.  Under 
the NFL Superbowl ticket policy, 99% of the game tickets were 
distributed to NFL insiders, rather than sold to the public at-
                                              
10 Further, Plaintiffs clearly articulated this theory in 
their briefing to the District Court opposing Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss.  They explained that their claims “ha[d] 
nothing to do with whether Defendants would ever reduce the 
prices of their bottles of medication.  The reason patients would 
save money is that they would not need to buy so many bottles” 
at the same price, because their bottles “would have lasted 
longer” and ultimately “their therapy would [have] cost them 
less.”  D.N.J. Civ. Case No. 14-5859, Doc. No. 91, at 20-21. 
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large.  The plaintiff claimed that this policy reduced the 
number of tickets available in the resale market.  Id.  Under the 
basic economic principle of supply and demand then, the 
policy resulted in an inflated ticket price in the resale market, 
according to the plaintiff.  Id. at 199-200.  We rejected 
plaintiff’s theory, as the plaintiff pled no facts to support their 
assertion that the NFL’s policy would actually reduce the 
number of tickets in the resale market, since League insiders 
had the same incentives to resell their tickets for a large profit 
as the public at-large.  Id. at 200-02.   
 
The alternative iteration of Plaintiffs’ pricing theory 
does not depend on a comparable presumption essential to their 
allegations of financial harm.  As explained, the reduced size 
of the bottle dropper tip is the only change from the status quo.  
Accordingly, we find the pricing theory sufficient to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement. 
 
Even if we had agreed that the pricing theory was too 
speculative to confer standing, the District Court did not appear 
to have the same concern about the reimbursement theory.  
Rather, the District Court rejected the reimbursement theory 
because it was not a theory of injury that previously had been 
recognized in fraud cases.  Fraud cases, and the theories of 
injury recognized in those cases, are inapposite here for the 
reasons explained above.  Plaintiffs’ allegations concern 
unfairness and unconscionability.  Therefore, under either 
theory, Plaintiffs’ harm is “actual” and satisfies this final 
component of injury in fact. 
 
* * * 
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Having found Plaintiffs to sufficiently allege in their 
Amended Complaint the “‘invasion of a legally protected 
interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,’” Spokeo, 136 S.Ct. 
at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560), we hold that 
Plaintiffs have alleged an injury in fact sufficient to confer 
Article III standing to challenge Defendants’ allegedly unfair 
business practices under the enumerated state consumer 
protection statutes.  Of course, it could be that the District 
Court’s legal interpretation of those statutes will not protect 
against the complained-of business practices and thus will not 
provide Plaintiffs with the relief they seek.  But that question 
goes to the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims under the law, and 
should be tested through Defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6).11   
                                              
11 The Dissent suggests that Plaintiffs have not 
established standing because their “alleged economic injury” 
is “overly speculative.”  Diss. Op. at 7.  It discusses in some 
detail Plaintiffs’ theory of economic injury, which our 
colleague regards as unreasonable. Our learned colleague also 
cites to Dominquez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d 1359 (D.C. Cir. 
2012), for the proposition that too-speculative economic 
injuries cannot confer standing.   
 
Three years after Dominquez, the D.C. Circuit 
considered a case which a District Court had dismissed for lack 
of standing on the purported basis of “an attenuated, 
speculative chain of events that relies on numerous 
independent actors.”  Osborn v. Visa Inc., 797 F.3d 1057, 1063 
(D.C. Cir. 2015).  In reversing the District Court, the D.C. 
Circuit specifically rejected the lower court “demanding proof 
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The District Court did not reach Defendants’ Rule 
12(b)(6) arguments in this case.  So that question is for another 
day.  For the reasons already discussed, we will not require 
Plaintiffs to prove Defendants’ business practices are unfair 
under state consumer protection statutes in order to find that 
they have standing to level those attacks in the first place.  La. 
Energy and Power Authority v. Fed. Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n, 141 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 
B 
  
Defendants Falcon, Sandoz, and Akorn, the generic 
manufacturers, contend that even if we find that Plaintiffs have 
standing to pursue their claims, we should affirm the dismissal 
of their Amended Complaint on an alternative ground: because 
their claims are preempted by federal law.  Specifically, these 
Defendants contend they cannot unilaterally make changes to 
their products’ bottle droppers without FDA approval, because 
                                              
of an economic theory that was not required in a complaint,” 
id., and differentiated between cases decided at later stages 
(such as summary judgment) and dismissals on the basis of 
lack of standing.  Id. at 1064.  “A Rule 12(b)(1) motion . . . is 
not the occasion for evaluating the empirical accuracy of an 
economic theory.”  Id. at 1065-66.  In its discussion of the 
merits of Plaintiffs’ theory of economic injury—partly by 
reference to out-of-record material, Diss. Op. at 7, fn. 24-25—
the Dissent engages in just that type of evaluation.  Whether 
Plaintiffs defeat motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim 
and for summary judgment, or can convince a jury, the facts 
alleged “pass muster for standing purposes at the pleadings 
stage.”  Osborn, 797 F.3d at 1066.   
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a change to the dropper would be considered “major,” and all 
“major” changes require FDA approval to take effect.  
Therefore, they argue, federal impossibility preemption is 
appropriate, since they could not simultaneously comply with 
FDA requirements and with state consumer protection laws 
that required them to manufacturer bottles with smaller tips.12  
Further, these Defendants argue that claims against generic 
manufacturers should be preempted because FDA regulations 
require generic products to have the same bottle design as their 
brand name equivalents.   
  
Plaintiffs argue in response that some manufacturers 
have changed their drop volumes over time without FDA 
approval, which suggests FDA approval is unnecessary.  
Plaintiffs also argue that there is no same-size-drop 
equivalence requirement between brand name and generic 
manufacturers, as reflected by the fact that drop sizes differ 
between these manufacturers already.   
  
The District Court did not reach preemption in this case, 
having found that Plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their 
claims.  We decline to address it in the first instance on appeal, 
as the record before us is not adequately developed to evaluate 
the parties’ arguments.   
 
V 
                                              
 12 Impossibility preemption, one of several types of 
preemption, applies “when it is ‘impossible for a private party 
to comply with both state and federal requirements.’”  In re 
Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litig., 852 
F.3d 268, 282 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 
564 U.S. 604, 618 (2011)). 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s dismissal of this action and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
1 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 Article III of our Constitution is a strict master, 
preserving constitutional strictures imposed on courts through 
the requirement that only true cases and controversies be 
heard.  The Majority today, however, erodes these strictures 
by allowing the plaintiffs here to manufacture a purely 
speculative injury in order to invoke our jurisdiction.  They 
assert that the defendants could have manufactured a more 
efficient product, which in turn could have lowered plaintiffs’ 
overall treatment costs.  Because this approach ignores both 
clear precedent from the Supreme Court and the complexities 
of pricing in the pharmaceutical industry, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
I 
 I begin by defining the exact nature of the harm that 
the plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result of the 
defendants’ conduct.  The plaintiffs are the users of 
prescription eye drops for various visual ailments.  The 
defendants manufacture and sell the eye drops used by the 
plaintiffs in bottles containing a fixed volume of fluid.  The 
bottles have dropper tips, which dispense more fluid than is 
medically necessary to treat the plaintiffs’ ailments, causing 
some portion of each drop to be wasted.  While the plaintiffs 
and the Majority note that exposing one’s eyes to too much of 
the fluid can have negative side effects, no plaintiff in the 
purported class alleges to have suffered harmful medical 
consequences.  The plaintiffs’ sole injury, therefore, is the 
money spent on that portion of a single eye drop which 
2 
 
exceeds the medically necessary volume.1  The plaintiffs do 
not argue that they were charged more than the market price 
for eye drops; rather, they argue that the defendants could 
manufacture a hypothetical eye dropper that would dispense 
the exact amount of fluid needed to maximize efficacy 
without waste.  Were the defendants to produce such a 
dropper, they continue, the effective lifespan of each bottle of 
medicine would increase, reducing the plaintiffs’ long-term 
treatment costs by reducing the number of bottles each 
plaintiff would have to purchase.  Notably, their case depends 
on the assumption that no other changes would occur in the 
market to prevent them from capturing the additional value of 
each bottle at no extra cost.  It is the strength of this 
assumption that we must evaluate. 
 
II 
 As the Majority recognizes, constitutional standing has 
three core elements:  (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and 
(3) redressability.2  A complaint must adequately plead all 
three elements to invoke federal court jurisdiction.3  In 
reviewing the adequacy of a complaint’s assertion of 
standing, we employ the familiar standards used in evaluating 
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim; we accept all of 
                                                          
1 While the plaintiffs and the Majority discuss two separate 
theories explaining how to arrive at this figure—the “pricing 
theory” and the “reimbursement theory”—both depend on the 
critical assumption that pricing was based on volume, not on 
effective doses.  I find this assumption untenable, and 
therefore I will not address the theories separately. 
2 Hassan v. City of N.Y., 804 F.3d 277, 289 (3d Cir. 2015). 
3 Id. 
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the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, reject conclusions, 
and assess the plausibility of the plaintiff’s standing in light 
of the well-pleaded allegations.4  In this evaluation, however, 
we may make only reasonable inferences in support of the 
plaintiff’s claim to standing.5 
 
This case turns on whether the plaintiffs have 
adequately alleged the “[f]irst and foremost”6 of the 
“irreducible constitutional minimum”7 of standing:  injury in 
fact.  Such injury must be sufficiently concrete; “that is, it 
must actually exist.”8  As such, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly expressed “reluctance to endorse standing theories 
that rest on speculation about the decisions of independent 
actors.”9  Complaints alleging such abstract and speculative 
injuries have been rejected, both by our Court and by the 
Supreme Court for failing to give rise to a reasonable 
inference of injury in fact.10  While the Majority properly 
                                                          
4 In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer 
Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). 
5 In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 
846 F.3d 625, 633 (3d Cir. 2017). 
6 Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 103 
(1998). 
7 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
8 Id. at 1548. 
9 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013). 
10 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 495-
96 (2009); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 157 (1990); 
City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983) (“Abstract 
injury is not enough.”); Knick v. Township of Scott, 862 F.3d 
310, 319 (3d Cir. 2017); Miller v. Nissan Motor Acceptance 
Corp., 362 F.3d 209, 225 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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notes these governing principles of constitutional standing,11 
it ignores clear law cautioning against recognizing Article III 
standing based on the types of conjectural allegations that the 
plaintiffs advance here.  Further, the Majority’s reasoning 
ignores the complex nature of pharmaceutical markets as they 
currently operate, relying on an unreasonable set of 
assumptions to reach its desired outcome.  I address both 
issues in turn. 
 
A 
Just last year, in Finkelman v. National Football 
League, we reaffirmed that “[p]laintiffs do not allege an 
injury-in-fact when they rely on a chain of contingencies or 
mere speculation.”12  I believe that Finkelman all but decides 
this case.  There, a plaintiff brought suit against the NFL, 
alleging that the NFL’s practice of withholding approximately 
99% of Super Bowl tickets for certain insiders artificially 
inflated the price of tickets available via the resale market.  
The plaintiff argued that he suffered an economic injury 
because he was forced to buy a ticket on the secondary 
market for $2,000, which was $1,200 more than the face 
                                                          
11 I take no issue with the Majority’s conclusion that actual 
economic injuries are generally invasions of legally protected 
interests, or that the alleged injury here would be 
particularized to purchasers of the eye drops.  I disagree, 
however, with the Majority’s conclusion that the plaintiffs’ 
alleged economic injuries “actually exist.”  Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 
at 1547. 
12 Finkelman v. Nat’l Football League, 810 F.3d 187, 193 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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value of the ticket.13  We held that this allegation was 
insufficiently concrete, and declined to recognize his standing 
to sue.  We properly recognized that markets operate in 
complex ways.  First, we noted that insiders faced the same 
incentives to sell their tickets on the secondary market as did 
the general public.  Second, we noted that, given the insiders’ 
potential profit margins, insiders were more likely to sell on 
the secondary market at lower prices, suggesting that the 
withholding could have no effect, and potentially even a 
positive one, on secondary market prices.  Taken together, 
these two propositions made clear that any potentially 
unlawful conduct by the NFL did not necessarily result in 
higher prices to the plaintiff; we concluded that “we have no 
way of knowing whether the NFL’s withholding of tickets 
would have had the effect of increasing or decreasing prices 
on the secondary market.”14 
 
While Finkelman spoke primarily about market 
unpredictability in the context of third party action, it relied 
heavily on the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit’s opinion in Dominguez v. UAL Corp.,15 which 
involved no intervening third parties.  There, a plaintiff 
sought to challenge a policy by United Airlines that prevented 
resale of tickets, arguing that allowing a secondary market 
would bring down prices in the aggregate.  Much like the 
plaintiffs here have done by attaching scientific studies to 
their Amended Complaint, Dominguez introduced expert 
evidence demonstrating that, holding all other forces being 
equal, a change in United Airlines’s policy would result in 
                                                          
13 Id. at 197-98. 
14 Id. at 200. 
15 666 F.3d 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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lower overall prices for consumers.  The D.C. Circuit rejected 
this argument, reasoning that it “assume[d] that United would 
continue to offer the same types of tickets that it does now” 
without accounting for the possibility that United “would 
need to alter its pricing strategy, which may very well result 
in higher average ticket prices . . ..”16  Because this attempt to 
“pile[] speculation atop speculation” fell short of 
Dominguez’s obligations under Article III, the D.C. Circuit 
held that Dominguez lacked standing to bring the action.17 
 
Taken together, Finkelman and Dominguez make clear 
that, for purposes of analyzing economic injuries in the 
context of marketwide effects, we cannot do precisely what 
the plaintiffs here ask of us:  isolate and change one variable 
while assuming that no downstream changes would also 
occur.  These cases are not outliers; rather, they reflect courts’ 
skepticism about plaintiffs’ ability to satisfy the case or 
controversy requirement of Article III by relying on such 
imaginative economic theories.18  Thus, contrary to the 
Majority’s assertion,19 the plaintiffs’ pricing theory does in 
fact depend on exactly the sort of presumption rejected by us 
and by other courts—namely, the presumption that no other 
                                                          
16 Id. at 1364. 
17 Id. 
18 See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 
344-45 (2006) (finding an alleged injury too conjectural for 
failing to account for “how [other actors] respond to a 
reduction in revenue . . .”);  
19 Maj. Op. at 27 (distinguishing Finkelman on the grounds 
that “Plaintiffs’ pricing theory does not depend on a 
comparable presumption essential to their allegations of 
financial harm”). 
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aspects of the market would change once the defendants’ 
conduct did.  It is true that we “credit allegations of injury 
that involve no more than application of basic economic 
logic.”20  However, Finkelman makes clear that this principle 
distinguishes “between allegations that stand on well-pleaded 
facts and allegations that stand on nothing more than 
supposition.”21  As other courts have noted, this distinction is 
critical at the pleading stage for a simple reason:  assumptions 
about basic economic logic are susceptible to proof at trial.22  
The plaintiffs here ask more:  they ask us to assume certain 
facts about other actors’ behavior—exactly the sort of 
assumption that cannot be proven at trial.  Accordingly, I 
would reject the plaintiffs’ alleged economic injury as overly 
speculative and untenable under existing precedent.23 
B. 
 Although the speculative nature of the plaintiffs’ 
alleged injury would likely be fatal regardless of the nature of 
the product, it is worth noting that their theory is a 
particularly bad fit for the market for pharmaceuticals, 
                                                          
20 Finkelman, 810 F.3d at 201 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
21 Id. 
22 Osborn v. Visa Inc., 797 F.3d 1057, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 
2015) (finding basic economic assumptions sufficient to 
satisfy injury requirement where plaintiffs’ “sorts of 
assumptions [we]re provable at trial”). 
23 See United Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 891 F.2d 908, 912 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“When considering any chain of allegations 
for standing purposes, we may reject as overly speculative 
those links which are predictions of future events (especially 
future actions to be taken by third parties) . . ..”). 
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undercutting the reasonableness of the assumptions they ask 
us to make and the inference of economic harm they ask us to 
draw in their favor.  The plaintiffs essentially ask us to 
assume that the defendants price their medication by volume; 
thus, in the plaintiffs’ view, changing the eyedropper size 
would not change the price of the medicine, while extending 
the useful lifespan of each bottle, driving down their 
aggregate costs.  This assumption is unreasonable, given the 
unique nature of markets for medical goods and services. 
 
 Pharmaceutical companies have, for some time now, 
recognized that “unit-based pricing[] is too one-dimensional 
for the marketplace’s current needs.”24  Increasingly, 
throughout the United States and the world, manufacturers 
engage in “value-based pricing” which deemphasizes the 
overall volume of medicine received by the patient in favor of 
an assessment of the value—measured in part by effective 
doses—received by a patient.25  Amici raise this point 
                                                          
24 Ellen Licking & Susan Garfield, A Road Map To Strategic 
Drug Pricing, IN VIVO, March 2016, at 1, 3, available online 
at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-in-vivo-a-
road-map-to-strategic-drug-prices-subheader/$FILE/ey-in-
vivo-a-road-map-to-strategic-drug-prices-subheader.pdf. 
25 DELOITTE CENTER FOR HEALTH SOLUTIONS, VALUE-BASED 
PRICING FOR PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLICATIONS OF THE SHIFT 
FROM VOLUME TO VALUE 3 (2012), available online at 
http://deloitte.wsj.com/cfo/files/2012/09/ValueBasedPricing 
Pharma.pdf.  Pricing in the medical services sector is unique 
in this regard, as the standard economic forces that set prices 
for consumer goods do not apply to prescription drugs.  This 
is in part due to the disjunction between the source of 
payment for services (insurers) and the end users of services 
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effectively in their briefing, noting that “patients demand 
treatment, not fluid volume, so demand for defendants’ 
products is properly measured in doses, not in milliliters.”26  
Thus, alternative pricing models have begun to take hold in 
pharmaceutical markets across the world.27  Some of the 
plaintiffs’ own studies confirm this, noting that the cost of the 
plaintiffs’ therapy “may be based on several factors 
[including drop size].”28  The net effect of this shift is to sever 
the link between volume and price upon which the plaintiffs’ 
alleged injury depends.  As amici argue, therefore, it is likely 
that the defendants “priced their products based on how many 
therapeutic doses (not how many milliliters of fluid) they 
contained, so that improvements in the products’ efficiency 
would not have saved the plaintiffs any money.”29 
 
 The plaintiffs, in the same breath in which they accuse 
the District Court of misunderstanding their pricing theory, 
misunderstand the importance of such countervailing market 
forces.  As the District Court observed, the studies provided 
by the plaintiffs all tend to “assume[] as true that 
manufacturers of eye drops would price their medication 
solely based on the volume of the fluid contained in the 
                                                                                                                                  
(patients).  See Licking & Garfield, A Road Map To Strategic 
Drug Pricing, at 3. 
26 Amicus Br. of the Am. Tort Reform Assoc., U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs., & Pharma. Research & 
Mfrs. of Am. (hereafter, “ATRA Br.”) at 11. 
27 Licking & Garfield, A Road Map to Strategic Drug 
Pricing, at 7. 
28 Am. Compl. ¶ 192. 
29 ATRA Br. at 9. 
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bottled.”30  The reason for this observation is not to suggest 
that the defendants would lower their prices in response to a 
new dropper design; rather, it is to suggest that the price of 
each bottle could actually increase if each bottle provided 
more doses. 
 
 At its core, therefore, the plaintiffs’ Amended 
Complaint asks us to make an assumption about the effects of 
changing the size of the defendants’ eye droppers which does 
not reflect market conditions and pressures in the 
pharmaceutical industry.  As such, the plaintiffs ask us to 
speculate about a theoretical eye dropper design, then draw an 
unreasonable inference about the downstream consequences 
of such an innovation.  Because the realities of the 
pharmaceutical industry make such inferences unreasonable, 
the Majority errs by accepting them at face value.  The 
plaintiffs have failed to plausibly allege standing. 
III 
I am sympathetic to the difficulties in demonstrating 
marketwide injuries in class action litigation.  The difficulty 
of such a showing, however, is not an excuse to treat 
jurisdiction lightly; “jurisdiction is a strict master.”31  Today’s 
ruling flouts this principle, allowing class action plaintiffs to 
ignore “the exacting federal standing requirements”32 by 
offering nothing more than speculation about complex and 
industry-specific pricing models.  On a practical level, the 
Majority also invites judges—rather than industry experts, 
                                                          
30 JA 17. 
31 State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 411 
(3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 Goode v. City of Phila., 539 F.3d 311, 318 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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market forces, or agency heads—to second-guess the efficacy 
of product design even in the most opaque of industries.  
Because I am troubled by both the legal and practical 
ramifications of the Majority’s decision, I respectfully 
dissent. 
 
